forest. Of course, when fire, flood or landslide clears a patch in the forest, the process starts again in that patch. During the process, should not mistake a temporary phase for the ultimate steady state.
This model implies that eventually most foreign banks will no longer find retail banking in Mexico interesting. As they compete with each other by introducing new products, by squeezing intermediation margins, etc., they remove the conditions that drew them. Some foreign banks will stay, particularly the efficient ones, but many will reassess their Mexican operations. The banks will be making a normal return on capital there, but they will want to redeploy their capital to areas where they can earn above normal returns. Those banks are going to sell out to local domestic banks, and to local entrepreneurs who will take over the banks. The banks the foreigners owned won't disappear; their ownership and control will simply revert to domestic hands.
Like all biological analogies and metaphors, ecological succession has its limitations. Still, we believe that the analogy can facilitate understanding of the trajectory of foreign ownership of banks in Mexico.
The situation in Mexico
From 1934 until the mid-1990s, Citibank was the only foreign bank with a branch in Mexico, save for the Deutsch-Südamerikanische Bank, which the Mexican government closed in 1943 when Mexico declared war on Germany (Marichal and Riguzzi 2006) .
Earlier, various other foreign banks had entered Mexico by establishing branches in Mexico City, but over time all had either left or reduced the scale of their efforts (see below). Successive Mexican governments proceeded to permit Citibank to remain although they prohibited foreign banks from establishing any new branches or subsidiaries, or acquiring Mexican banks. Some foreign banks did establish representative offices that could neither take deposits nor make loans.
In 1982, the Mexican government nationalized the 68 domestic banks and subsequently consolidated them into 18. Liberalization began soon after, with the government selling about 30 per cent of the shares of 13 of the 18 banks through public offerings (Lopez-de-Silanes and Zamarripa 1995) . In 1989, the new Salinas administration introduced a series of deregulation measures.
The liberalization culminated in 1991 and 1992 with the government privatizing the banks in a series of auctions (Christopherson and Hovey 1996) . At the time, existing Mexican law prohibited foreign firms from participating in the auctions. The privatized banks sold at a premium to the price of banks in other financial markets, and most of the owners came from what Minushkin (2002) calls the bolseros, the investment banking and stockbroking community, rather than the traditional banquero elite. This had two causes.
First, Lopez-Portillo's wish to punish those who had caused (or not helped) the crisis withstood both the De la Madrid and Salinas governments. With few exceptions, the former owners of banks had no significant stakes in the financial groups post-1992.
Second, the privatization law called for the creation of financial groups with at least three subsidiaries, a bank, a stockbrokerage, and a third such as a fund management company.
This left the bolseros as the logical source of acquirers. A period of "hyper competition" apparently followed as the owners of the newly privatized banks sacrificed profitability to gain market share and position (Gruben and McComb 2003) . Unfortunately, the bolseros skills were mainly in money market trading due to the huge growth of government domestic borrowing, and not in banking.
In June 1992 the government authorized banks to issue shares up to 30 per cent of their capital that foreigners could own, though one owner could hold no more than 5 per cent, or 10 per cent with Ministry of Finance approval (Lopez-de-Silanes and Zamarripa 1995) . In the NAFTA negotiations, Mexico was able to keep its banking sector highly protected from foreign entry (Minsuhkin 2002) . Foreign banks could only operate as subsidiaries, not branches of the parent, and initially each foreign bank could account for no more than 1.5 per cent of the market, and foreign banks as a whole could not account for more than eight per cent of the market. The Treaty provided for the gradual elimination of the restrictions, but subsequent events hastened the process.
When the government privatized the banks, the legal and regulatory framework governing the banking sector did not keep pace, and oversight was inadequate (Unal and Navarro 1999) . The government underestimated the necessary investment in regulators and their skills to oversee the return to competition in banking. Consequently, the hypercompetition left the banks vulnerable when the 1994 Peso Crisis devastated the economy, with the result that many banks ended up back in the government's hands. In February 1995, Mexico changed its financial services laws to allow foreign banks to buy majority stakes in Mexican counterparts in exchange for cleaning up their balance sheets.
However, the law limited foreign shareholdings in the top three Mexican banksBanamex, Bancomer and Serfin-to a maximum 20 per cent stake. The law authorized the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit to permit foreign financial institutions to acquire a controlling interest in those banks whose capital represented less than 6 per cent of the total net capital of the Mexican banking industry (Palomares 1999) . Then in December 1998, Congress removed these restrictions as well, permitting foreigners to own 100 per cent of any Mexican bank, including these three largest banks. The need to recapitalize and rehabilitate the Mexican banking industry led to a spate of acquisitions, re-privatizations, and the liquidation of four banks (Bubel and Skelton 1998) .
The evolution of the foreign banks' current presence
Half-a-dozen foreign banks-two from Spain, two from Canada, one from the UK, and one from the United States-have been the most important foreign acquirers of Mexican banks. Santander (formerly BSCH -Banco Santander Central Hispano), and BBVA (Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria) have invested throughout Latin America, and their presence in Mexico is part of this strategy (Guillén and Tschoegl 2000; ) . One attraction of Mexico for the Spanish banks is that it provides a back door to the United States where, Puerto Rico aside, until recently neither bank has had a major presence.
(By contrast, Mexican banks, most notably Banamex, had developed a minor presence in the south-western United States.) Also Mexico was a major destination for Spanish direct investment in general, not just in financial services (Bátiz-Lazo et al., forthcoming).
Banco Santander has had a window on Mexico since 1955 when it opened a representative office in Mexico City. In 1994, following the establishment of NAFTA, Santander was able to create Grupo Financiero Santander Mexico. This consisted of three subsidiaries, an investment banking operation with several offices, which Santander staffed with a small team of highly trained executives, a stockbrokerage, and a fund Starting in 1991, then Banco Bilbao Vizcaya (BBV) acquired a 2% stake in Banco Mercantil Probursa, which it quickly raised to 10%, at Probursa's invitation and initiative.
1 Probursa was a stockbroker and when it acquired Banco Mercantil it wanted access to expertise to help it grow in retail banking. In 1993 BBV raised its stake to 30%.
BBV was interested in increasing its stake but Probursa's management was unwilling.
Still, Probursa ran into difficulties and in 1995, BBV was the first foreign bank to take a majority stake in a Mexican financial group when it raised its ownership to 70%. and Canada (Tschoegl 2004b) , and was building a major presence elsewhere in Latin America, especially in Brazil, as part of its strategy to be "The world's local bank".
Of the six largest banks, the only one that is not foreign-owned is Banorte, which is the 5 th largest bank in Mexico. Banorte traces its origins to the founding in 1899 of Banco Mercantil de Monterrey and to the 1947 founding of Banco regional del Norte.
The two banks merged in 1986 to form Banco Mercantil del Norte. In late 2001, Banorte spent US$125mn to acquire Bancrecer, which IPAB had taken over in 1999. Bancrecer had itself taken over another bank, Banoro, in 1997.
Statistical Analysis
One simple technique for analyzing the strategies and efficiency of banks is to perform a linear regression of total assets on the number of employees and the number of branches (Choi and Tschoegl 1984) . In the regression for the data for the six largest banks from 2001, the coefficient for the number of was negative, suggesting that branch expansion either under government ownership or in the subsequent hypercompetition had led banks into locations where they could gather fewer assets, either because of the number of people there or their wealth (Table 2a ). The residuals from the regression show that Bital had the smallest amount of assets, relative to the number of its branches and employees; Santander-Serfin had the highest (Table 2b ). (Bital was known for opening mini-branches in supermarkets and the like.)
The same regression, using data from 2005, still shows Bital with the smallest amount of assets relative to the number of its branches and employees, and SantanderSerfin with the highest (Table 2b ). Now, the coefficient for branches is positive (Table   2a ), suggesting that the decrease in branches at the four largest-foreign-owned-banks (Tabe 1), was due to the closure of marginal branches. However, this rationalization by the large foreign banks has provided an opportunity for smaller banks, which as a class have greatly increased the number of their branches (Table 1) .
Still, Schulz (2005) shows that FDI has had a positive but only limited effect on the development of the banking sector. What the foreign banks accomplished was to recapitalize the banking sector. However, he argues that the low level of competitive intensity so far has limited the transfer of skills, technology, or management know-how. Haber and Musacchio (2005) found that relative to domestic banks, foreign banks granted less credit, screened loans more intensively, and charged lower interest rate spreads.
They attribute this to risk aversion engendered by a Mexican environment that provides weak enforcement for contract rights. Interestingly, they also found that the foreign banks were less profitable than the domestic banks, once they excluded the foreign banks'
income from fees for services.
Ecological succession
The simple textbook story of ecological succession discusses how forests develop on previously uninhabited landforms. One example would be the development of forests in previous glacial regions in North America and Western Europe after the last Ice Age.
The story begins with primary succession as pioneering species of small plants first colonize the available terrain. As these pioneering plants increase in size and influence, competition between them and the changes they cause in soil and light conditions facilitates secondary succession, the establishment and survival of succeeding organisms that are better adapted than the pioneering species to the emerging conditions.
Eventually, a final self-maintaining community, such as a climax forest, emerges (Collier et al. 1973) . As Bormann and Likens (1979) point out, secondary succession may also follow the abandonment of once cultivated land or disturbances such as fire, flood, landslides or tree-falls that have left some trace of earlier organic activity. In either case, succession culminates in a steady-state in which the forest is self-replicating.
Further research has specified the four mechanisms involved, more than one of which may be in operation at any particular time, with the relative importance of the mechanisms depending on the climate (Botkin 1993) . In the competitive hierarchy mechanism, late succession species start to arrive as members of the early succession species reach the end of their life-cycle and die out; this mechanism delays, or at least does not facilitate succession.
With the tolerance mechanism, early succession species do not affect the rate of recruitment, growth or survival of later species. The early species simply arrive and grow more quickly. Later species can grow during the early succession phase but better tolerate the more limited resources that prevail when competition is well established.
In the facilitation mechanism, one species prepares the way for the second. An extreme case of facilitation would have the early species as a necessary condition for the survival of the later species. More usually, the presence of the early species leads to earlier arrival or greater success for later species.
Lastly, reverse interference is the direct opposite of the competitive hierarchy mechanism. Late succession species interfere with the continuation of early succession species instead of early succession species impeding late succession species. stage. However, even without government intervention, it will eventually achieve this third, steady state with a foreign presence that is much reduced from its current situation in which foreign banks own over 80 per cent of the assets in banks.
Applying ecological succession to foreign banking
Foreign banks are among the weeds that first respond to the disturbed, hospitable soil that liberalization, crisis, or transition has created. The foreign banks that respond to these opportunities are often willing to enter retail banking as well as traditional international banking and can respond quickly because they are well-capitalized, efficient, and have surplus managerial resources (Kindleberger 1969 and Tschoegl 2004) .
The ecological succession metaphor is a model of the evolution of a system after a disturbance; it is not a model for the role of foreign banks in mature, stable markets.
Still, as Tschoegl (2002a&b and shows for Norway and a number of other countries, even in mature markets, the model has applicability in crises and their aftermath. Papp (2005) too has documented the increased presence of foreign banks after a financial crisis. Tschoegl (2001) provides a discussion of the role of foreign banks in a large, competitive market such as the U.S.; in essence, in mature markets foreign banks generally specialize in niches and engage in wholesale and corporate banking.)
One can think of the share of banking system assets in foreign banks relative to total banking system assets as the fast responding plants' proportion of the system's biomass. The ecological succession process involves both a numerator and a denominator effect, where the numerator consists of the market share of the foreign banks, and the denominator is the total banking system, foreign and domestic. The behavior of the foreign banks themselves has a large effect on the numerator. Over the long term, the response of the domestically owned banks will have a large effect on the denominator. Obviously, when a domestic bank buys a foreign bank, this reduces the numerator, while leaving the denominator unchanged.
Initially, as the foreign banks enter, especially when they acquire host country banks in privatizations, rescues, recapitalizations and rehabilitations, the numerator grows more rapidly than the denominator. The reason the foreign banks enter is the opportunities the situations present, now that the banks are free to enter. One source of opportunity can be the foreign banks' efficiency relative to that of the domestic banks. In the Czech Republic and Poland foreign-owned banks were more efficient than domesticowned banks and this was not due to scale differences or the structure of activities (Weill 2003 Claessens et al. (2001) found that in industrial countries foreign banks tend to have lower margins and profits than domestic banks, but that the opposite holds in developing countries.
The markets that draw the foreign banks tend to be ones that are growing, underbanked or uncompetitive, but the point is that foreign banks' entry changes these markets. The literature on the effect of foreign banks on host country banking systems, suggests that the effect is precisely to undermine the conditions associated with the presence of foreign banks. For instance, Lensink and Hermes (2004) find that in developing countries, foreign entry is associated with shrinking margins, but this is not necessarily the case in developed countries. In the Philippines foreign competition compelled domestic banks to be more efficient, to focus operations, and to become less dependent on relationship-based banking practices (Unite and Sullivan 2002 ).
This means that over time, measured in decades, the foreign banks will find the conditions that drew them have eroded, and some will withdraw, selling their subsidiaries to locally-owned banks. The histories of particular banks or of banking systems in particular countries suggest four factors that operate to reduce the foreign presence. First, some foreign banks leave when they find they are not competitive. Second, some foreign banks they find themselves in difficulty at home and sell the foreign operation in order to raise funds. Third, others sell out to local investors and banks when host country markets are depressed and the foreign owners see little benefit from staying. Lastly, some simply sell out to local banks growing by acquisition. In the mid-1990s, foreign banks rushed to acquire banks in Argentina, to the point where the assets in foreign-owned banks reached some 50 per cent of banking system assets. However, as the Argentina's economic situation worsened, many turned over their banks to the government-sponsored rescues, or sold out. In the long-run, foreign banks in general have no comparative advantage in retail banking vis-à-vis host country banks, especially in reaching rural areas and the unbanked.
Even when the foreign banks are better than local banks at both wholesale and corporate banking on the one hand and retail banking on the other, the local banks will have a comparative advantage in retail banking. That is, the local banks will be less worse at retail banking than at wholesale and corporate banking. Even in countries where foreign banks initially dominate the banking sector, one should expect to see domestic banks come to dominate retail banking. The foreign banks will specialize in foreign activities pari passu with the emergence or growth of local competitors, even if they do not immediately exit retail banking. Still, often a foreign bank will sell its retail activities to a local bank while retaining a branch in the national financial capital to enable it to continue to offer corporate and wholesale banking services. For instance, when in 1991
Chase Manhattan Bank reduced the presence in Puerto Rico that it had had there since 1934, it sold its retail branches to Banco Roig, a leading local bank.
Denominator effects complement numerator effects to reduce the ratio of assets in foreign-owned banks to total assets in the banking system. As Huang and Di (2003) point out, the conditions that constrain foreign firms in a country may also constrain host country firms. When the conditions constrain host country firms more than they do foreign firms, the foreign firms may increase their ownership of assets in the host country. However, the liberalization and regulatory reform that accompany the entry of the foreign firms benefits the domestic firms as well. It will take time for the domestic firms to overcome their administrative heritage from the earlier environment, but once they do, one can expect them to grow rapidly. Liberalization and regulatory reform may also make it easier for entrepreneurs to create new domestic firms that will target niches that the foreign firms ignore. The result will be an increase in the numerator, and a decline in the ratio, even without denominator effects.
Although one should expect to see foreign banks to exit retail banking, not all will. Some particularly well-run foreign banks may retain a presence for a long time.
Currently, HSBC is striving to become, in the words of its slogan, "the world's local bank" (Tschoegl 2004b ). However, managements change and so do their strategies;
Some would suggest that "Globalization" undermines the metaphor of ecological succession. However, Goldsmith (1969, 360-367) , discussing financial systems outside Europe and North America during the 19 th and early 20 th Centuries, the first era of globalization, noted that foreign banks initiated the development of financial systems but that over time the lost their predominance to the subsequent rise of local banks. (Because Goldsmith's focus was on macroeconomics, he unfortunately did not go into detail.)
Still, we can summon some illustrative examples such as the development of banking and the banking sector in Brazil, especially after the reforms of 1905, which shows a pattern consistent with the ecological succession metaphor (Triner 1996 and . Koford and Tschoegl (2005) argue that the metaphor well describes the history of foreign banks in Bulgaria since the late 19 th Century. Tschoegl's earlier papers on the foreign bank presence in Japan (Tschoegl 1988) and Saudi Arabia (Tschoegl 2002b) , and Phylatkis' (1988) paper on the eclipsing of British banks in Cyprus before independence, also offer support for the metaphor's applicability.
Applying ecological succession to the Mexican case
The first point we would make is that ecological succession has occurred twice From the mid-1930s to the early 1990s, there was an interregnum during which the Mexican banking system was closed to foreign banks so no ecological succession took place. A key factor was the passage in 1941 of major banking legislation that formally barred any further foreign bank entry.
The third period of ecological succession began in 1991 with the privatization of the Mexican banking system. The collapse of the newly privatized banks created the disturbed soil of the model. The government initially permitted too little foreign entry for it to have any major effect. The need to recapitalize the banks, while also bringing in strategic investors with the necessary know-how forced the government to deregulate entry further. The result is that first phase of the process is complete.
The second phase has barely begun. Competition among the banks is not yet intense enough to force foreign banks to reconsider their strategies (Schulz 2005) . Nor have any of the foreign parents run into difficulties necessitating a rationalization of their overseas difficulties. As a result, we have seen minimal numerator effects, i.e., there has been no transfer of foreign banks to local ownership.
However, denominator effects, i.e., expansion by local banks, are already starting to occur. The data in Table 1 shows not just a reduction in the ratio of in assets in foreign owned banks relative to total banking system assets, but an expansion in the number of branches and employees at domestic banks. Here the erosion of the foreign banks' share has been much more dramatic than in assets, suggesting that the domestic banks have been expanding by targeting a less-prosperous mass-market clientele.
In 2002, the government granted its first new banking license since the Peso Crisis.
Grupo Elektra created Banco Azteca to build on the retail credit that Elektra had been offering for 50 years to customers at its three big discount stores. (Elektra's financing activities had grown rapidly from the 1990s and it had been lobbying for some time for a banking license.) Azteca uses some 3,000 motorcycle agents as collectors of loan or savings installments to extend its services to the poor and lower middle class.
Two more new banks are expected to start soon, both modeled roughly on Banco Azteca. One, Banco Autofin México, is being organized by a large firm that that organizes "circle of savers" schemes (consortios), under the name "Autofin". The company was initially oriented towards purchases of cars, but then also offered home mortgage programs. Coppel, a chain like Elektra, is organizing another. Bansefi, the government-owned Banco del Ahorro Nacional y Servicios Financieros, is organizing a network of savings banks and credit unions. In time, some of these may become commercial banks, and Bansefi itself is a target for privatization. Lastly, there are a number of non-bank financial service firms and entities that are coming into existence or expanding their services and operations. In time, these too may give rise to banks.
Conclusion
Foreign banks have responded to the opportunities that crises, deregulation, wars, or the transition from Communism have created. Some part of the entry was foreign banks pursuing normal international banking activity, and these branches and their activities will persist indefinitely, but never be of much quantitative importance. The part that draws the most concern in many countries around the world is foreign majority ownership of large domestic commercial banks. Discomfort can be especially acute when foreign-owned banks acquire major domestic banks and come to dominate the banking system, as is now the case in Mexico. However, one must understand that the foreign banks' initial presence is only the first phase in a process of ecological succession.
The foreign banks' initial success leads over time to the erosion of their predominance in the host banking system. As the banks, foreign and domestic-owned alike, become more competitive, the foreign owners will no longer have a comparative advantage in general retail and commercial banking, even if they retain an absolute advantage. Thus, in time, we can expect that many, if not all, foreign owners will sell their retail banking activities to domestic owners. The foreigners may retain a branch in the national financial center to conduct corporate and wholesale banking but will leave retail and general commercial banking to local banks. More importantly, the reforms that facilitated the entry of the foreign banks free the domestic banks to compete and grow.
The result will be that over time the proportion of banking system assets in foreignowned banks will decline to a long-run proportion much lower than we observe today.
This succession process has occurred twice before in Mexico's history and though it will probably require decades to reach its steady state, it is ongoing. 
